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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
or to exchange. It is, however, my wish and will that she-preserve as
far as she conveniently can the identity of the property and if apy .e-
mains at her death to R.
This was construed by the court as a life estate in N with power to con-
sume,6 and a vested remainder to R subject to divestment by the exercise of
the power.
The court applied the customary test in such cases by pointing out that
the inclusion of powers to the beneficiary which it would be unnecessary to
mention if a fee were intended, creates an inference that some lesser estate
was intended.7 Costly litigation might have been averted if the will
simply stated "to N for life with power, etc."'
MARSHALL I. NuRENBERG
INSURANCE
In the past year the Ohio courts have several times considered the right
of a beneficiary to exercise control over an insurance policy. In Zuber v.
Zuber,' the insured had been adjudged mentally incompetent. His wife
had been appointed his guardian. In four insurance polices on the in-
sured's life the wife was primary beneficiary with the right to receive cer-
tain payments during her life. Various relatives were contingent bene-
ficiaries to take upon the death of the wife. The wife, suing as guardian,
attempted to compel the insurance company to make her the sole bene-
ficiary under the policies. The court of appeals in reversing the
probate court held that this could not be done. As guardian she had. no
authority to institute an action for her sole benefit and not concerned with
the preservation of the ward's estate. As beneficiary she had no right to in-
terfere in the contract between the insured and insurer. The court reached
this result in the-face of evidence that all contingent beneficiaries consented
to the change; that the wife had assisted the insured in earning the money
out of which the premiums had, in the past, been paid; and, that, since the
estate of the ward was exhausted, if the policies were to be kept in ef-
fect, she in the future, would have to pay the premiums out of her own
funds.
In Wb'telaw v. Whstelaw,2 following a divorce action in which con-
structive service of process only had been had on the husband-defendant and
which terminated favorably to the wife-plaintiff, a supplemental petition
'Baxter v. Bowyer, 19 Ohio St. 490 (1869).
'Johnson v. Johnson, 51 Ohio St. 446, 38 N.E. 61 (1894).
'If a fee simple were intended, any attempted remainder is void. 41 Omo JuR. 742.
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was filed joining an insurance company -in an attempt to have.the.court
award the wife all right, title and interest in an insurance policy: The
policies were upon the husband's life with the wife as beneficiary. The
wife had for some years paid the premiums. The court of appeals refused
to interfere with the contractual relationship between the husband and the
insurer. 'The court, by the decree here under consideration,- was attempting
to make a new contract for the parties and the fact that a divorce court,
having jurisdiction of the person of the insured, might compel him to assign
to the plaintiff his interest in the policies as an incident of the divorce does
not authorize such action in the case of a non-resident served only by publi-
cation. An end otherwise unattainable is not to be attained by construing
a contract right as a property. "a
Stone v. Stephens4 a court of appeals while recognizing the Olu rule
that the provisions in a life insurance policy setting forth a prescribed man-
ner of changing the beneficiary are for the protection of the insured and
may be waived by him held that an insured could not change the beneficiary
by will since such change would take effect only upon the death of the in-
sured and the rights of a beneficiary, even where right to change is reserved,
become fixed upon the insured's death.
The omnibus clause in automobile liability insurance was once again
an actively litigated problem. West v. McNamara5 considered the construc-
tion of an automobile liability insurance policy which provided for coverage
to extend to "any person" using the automobile provided "the actual use
is with the permission of the named insured." Judgment had been against
the operator of the automobile and this case arises from an attempt to subject
the Insurance Company to liability in a supplemental petition. Insurance
had been issued to a business organization which had granted comprehen-
sive use of the automobile to one of the co-managers, who granted compre-
hensive use to his wife for a period of time. The wife sent a friend-on an
errand for her in the car but as the court pointed out, "it was a matter of
mere conjecture" as to the use which the driver was actually making of the
automobile at the time of the accident. The supreme court held "that the
permittee of a permittee of the named insured, in the absence of express.
or implied- authority of such named insured, cannot effectively permit a
fourth person to operate the vehicle so as to bring such person within the
protection of the policy."" It should be noted, in contemplating the actual
193 Ohio App. 195, 112 N.E2d 688 (1952).
'65 Ohio L Abs. 11, 113 N.E.2d 105 (App. 1952).
'lid. at 16, 113 N.E2d at 108.
' 92 Ohio App. 553, 110 N.E.2d 18 (1950), affld 155 Ohio St. 595, 99.N.E2d -766.
' 159 Ohio St. 187, 111 N.E2d 909 (1953).
'Id. at 197, 111 N.E.2d at 913.
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holding of this case that there is little proof as to the authority actually
given by the named insured, that the last proper permittee, the wife, was
not in the automobile at the tune of the accident, and, that there is doubt
as to whether the operator was, at the time of the accident, on the errand for
the wife or serving some purpose of his own. The court distinguishes the
present fact situation from that in Brown v. Kennedy.' Garlick v. Mc-
Farland s raised the question of the liability of an insurance company when
the insured had agreed to the sale of the automobile insured, had delivered
possession, had received the purchase price but had not transferred the rec-
ord title. In the instant case recovery had been had by the injured persons
against the operator of the automobile, the buyer, and a supplemental peti-
tion had been filed against the insurance company of the original owner, the
"named insured. The supreme court held that Ohio General Code Section
6290-3 et seq. (now Ohio Revised Code Section 4505.03 et seq.) govern
the ownership of automobiles in this state and that when the policy referred
to "owner" without further definition it used the term according to the
provisions of these statutes. Here no attempt had been made to transfer
the title. There had been no assignment of the certificate nor delivery of it
to the new purchaser. Under that circumstance title remained in the
original owner. Therefore, the liability policy continued in full effect and
recovery could be had if the use at the time of the accident was with the
permission of the named insured. It was held that the jury's finding that
permission had been granted could not be disturbed. The court dis-
tnguished Workmai; v Republic Mut. Ins. Co.' in which the seller had as-
signed and delivered the certificate to the purchaser but no new certificate
had been issued to the purchaser. In that case title was held to have passed
so that the seller's insurance company was not liable.
In Chastang v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York'0 the supreme court
was concerned with an insurance policy which provided for (1) life insur-
ance, (2) disability benefits, and (3) double indemnity. The- Company
set up separate reserves for each feature of the policy. The plaintiff con-
tended the Company's" obligation to make policy loans under the policy
applied to all three reserves. The court, however held that the loan obliga-
tion related solely to the reserve on the life insurance feature and neither
the policy nor the statutes of Ohio Tequired the Company-to grant loans based
on the reserves of the other two features.
In Saba v. Homeland Ins. Co." a fire insurance policy provided that,
141 Ohio St. 457, 48 N.E.2d 857 (1943).
159 Ohio St. 539, 113 N.E.2d 92 (1953).
' 144 Ohio St. 37, 56 N.E.2d 190 (1944).
'o 159 Ohio St. 167, 111 N.E.2d 395 (1953).
, 159 Ohio St. 237, 112 N.E.2d 1 (1953).
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if the insured and insurer failed to agree upon the amount of loss, upon the
demand of either, each should appoint an appraiser. The appraisers were
-to appoint an umpire. An award by any two would determine the amount
of loss. It was also provided that if the appraisers failed to select an umpire
he should be selected by the judge of a court of record. The insured duly
requested that the insurer appoint an appraiser and named Ins own. The
insurer took no action. Upon application the court appointed an umpire
and he, with the insured's appraiser, determined the amount of loss. The
appeal was taken on the authority of the court to appoint the umpire. The
supreme court rejected the company's contention that upon its failure to
appoint an appraiser the insured's only course of action was to file for breach
of contract. "The failure and refusal of the defendants to select an ap-
praiser constituted a failure to agree on an umpire just as effectively
as if they had selected an appraiser and instructed him not -to agree on an
umpire. Under these circumstances the plaintiff was authorized to request
the court to select such mpire."12
The courts apparently will never be finished with the question of "ac-
cidental means." In Hammer v. Mut. Ben. Health & Ace. Ass'tP recovery
was sought on a policy insuring against loss of life sustained "through
purely accidental means." Insured voluntarily exposed himself to.the ef-
fect of the sun on a hot day and died from "coronary occlusion." The
supreme court held that the death was caused by accidental means since the
heat exhaustion or sun stroke was suffered unexpectedly even though the
exposure to the sun was not the result of the accident.
In defending against a suit to recover double indemnity because of death
by accidental means, the Ohio Court of Appeals held" that an insurance
company may support its claim of suicide by showing that a material dis-
crepancy had recently been discovered in the-books of a lodge.'bf which
'the insured deceased was treasurer even though it could not be proved that
he had beei" responsible.'4
Another appellate case -considered incurrence of medical expense.15 In
an action on a medical expense provision of an automobile liability insur-
ance'p6l wiere recove± was limited to da-ims fokexpenses incurr6d with-
in one year of the accident the insurer was held liable for'the cost of ,ieat-
ment for which insured contracted and.paid within the period although -the
treatment was not' given until afterexpiration of'the period.
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'id. at 241, 112 N.E.2d at 3.
11 158 Ohio St. 394, 109 N.E.2d 649- (1952).
"Hartenstein v. New York Life Ins. Co., 93 Ohio App. 413, 113 N.E.2d 712
(1952).
"Drobne v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 115 N.E.2d 589 (Ohio App. 1950).
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